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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OFI UTAH
JESSE B. Srl t ):\1~~,
1

P l a i 11 f iff a nd A p p el1ant,
-vs.-

l

SALT LAKE CITY, a 1nunicipal corporation, J. BRA·CKEN LEE, JOEL. CHRISTE~\SEN", L. C. RO~INEY, T. I. GEliRTS
and J. K. Pil~~RCY, its Commissioners, ,
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF SALT
LAKE CITY, and GUS P. BACI(~IAN,
Case No.
its Seeretar~T' ZIONS SE·CURITIES CORD2GS
PORATION, a corporation, and THE
CORPORATION OF THE PRESIDENrr
OF THE CHURCI-I OF JESUS CHRIST
OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS, a corporation, sole,
Defendants and Respondents,
LYXN FAUSErrT AND FIAMETTA
F.A_1TRI£TT,
Plaintiffs in Intr:rrention and Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPO·NDENT
Zions Securities
PRELin1INARY

Co~rporation

STATE~IENT

The Defendant ZIO~S SEClTRITIES CORPORATION '"Till hereinafter be referred to as "ZIOXS SEClTRITIES," and the Defendant CORPORATIOX OF
THE PRESIDENT OF THE CHURC~H OF JESl~S
1
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CliRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAl~rrs \\'ill hereinafter
he referred to as "CORPORATIO~ O:F~ THE PRESIDEl~T." The Plaintiff and Appellant JESSE B. STON~
\vill hereinafter be referred to as "P L1\INTI~-,F'' and
the Plaintiffs in Intervention ,,. ill hereinafter be referred
to as "FAUSETT."
STATE1IEXT OF

F..:\C1~8

This Defendant Zions Securities, desires to restate
certain of the facts for clarification. It is a n1atter of
common knowledge that there have been considered various sites in Salt Lake ·City for the construction of a ne'v
Federal Building. One of the sites that ""'as considered by
the Federal Government was that site kno\Yn as the Lafayette School, located on North rremple bet,veen State
and }fain Street. Another site that has been considered
has been that of the Public Safety Building and Fire Hall
on the Southeast corner of JTirst South and State Street
and other sites had been considered, such as Fort Douglas and an area on Fourth South Street bet,veen ~lain
and \Y. est Temple. This ""'hole la\\.,suit ha~ its roots in the
selection of the site for a proposed Federal Building.
Originally the site considered for the Federal Building \v·as that of the Lafayette School. ~Ir. Burton ,,....
l\1 usser, one of the attorneys for the Plaintiff and ..~..~p
pellant herein, brought suit against Salt Lake City and
certain of the Defendants to enjoin the sale of that property. That suit is 8till pending. On February -t 1960, the
(~hamber of Co1nmerce hy ~lr. Gus C. Backman, subInitted a bid to Salt Lake c~ity for the purchase of the

2
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property known as the Public Safety Building and Fire
Station on the corner of First South and State Street in
Salt Lake City. (Par. 13, Plaintiff's Co1nplaint). I3y
the ter1ns of this bid, it was proposed that the property
would be purchased for $750,000.00 and possession "ras
to be given to the United States Government on or before
January 1, 1961. It \Yas further proposed that this property 1nay be used as the site of the construction of a ne\Y
Federal Building. This bid was accepted by Salt I..~ake
City for the sale of the property and shortly thereafter
this suit was filed by Mr. Stone through his attorneys,
including Mr. Musser, the attorney of the other case involving the Lafayette School.
Separate and apart from anything to do with the
Federal Building is the sale of Forest Dale Golf Course.
This sale was bet\veen Salt Lake City and the Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints. The contract of sale was on January
14, 1959. ~Iore than one year before the negotiationH
were undertaken for the sale of the Public Safety Building and Fire Station.
In the lawsuit that \vas filed by the Plaintiffs herein,
two causes of action \Vere alleged. The first relating to
the sale of the property hereinafter referred to as the
Public Safety property, and the second cause of action re.lating to the sale of Forest Dale Golf Course. In Plaintiff's First Cause of Action he seeks to declare null and
void the bid of the Chamber of Commerce of Salt Lalie
City and the acceptance by the Salt Lake City Colnmission, on the sale and transfer of the property known as
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Public Safety Building and seeks to enjoin the transfer
of this property.
In Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action he seeks to
declare null and void a contract for the sale of Forest
Dale Golf Course bet\veen Salt Lake City Corporation
and the Corporation of the President. It is interesting to
note so far as this Defendant is concerned that no\rhere
in Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action does the Plaintiff
allege or claim anything about this Defendant. The entire allegation as to Plaintiff's Second Cause of . A_ttion
relates to that contract between Salt Lake City and the
Corporation of the President. Insofar as the allegations
in Plaintiff's First Cause of Action about this Defendant,
Plaintiff alleges as follows:

1. This corporation was a corporation duly organized and existing under the la\YS of the State of Utah
(Paragraph 4, Page 2 of Plaintiff's Complaint);
2. All of the stock of this corporation is O\\Tned by
the Corporation of the President ~. (except a fe"T shares
placed in the name of its director~ to enable then1 to
qualify as directors thereof)". (Paragraph 5, Page 2
of Plaintiff's Complaint) ;
3. This corporation is engaged in carrying out the
financial business of the Corporation of the President
(Paragraph 5, Page 2, Plaintiff's Co1nplaint) ~
4. This corporation already has an option to purchase the Lafayette School for a Federal Building,
(Paragraph 12, Page 3 of Plaintiff\~ Con1plaint) ~
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The Plaintiff \\·hile he was a 1ne1nber of tl:t~
Chureh of Jesus ·Christ of Latter-day Saints contributed
tithing and has an interest in a trust fund (Paragraph
1, Page 1 of Plaintiff's Con1plaint);
t>.

6. This Defendant in conjunction ''"'ith other Defendants will prevail upon the LTnited States to build a
Federal Building at the site selected here, (Paragraph
~0, Page 6 of Plaintiff's Complaint) ;
7. The Trust Fund of the Corporation of the President and this Defendant can only be used for the men1bers of the Church for the benefit of religion, works of
charity, and for public worship and not for the purchase
of a site for a Federal Building, (Paragraph 20 (f) Page
7 of Plaintiff's Con1plaint).
Based upon these allegations insofar as Zions Secur]ties is concerned, Plaintiff claims that Zions Securities
should be enjoined from purchasing the property and
that the Court should declare that neither Zions Securities nor the Corporation of the President may purchase
the site for the erection of the Federal Building nor use
any of their assets to the pay1nent in the purchase price
thereof, (Paragraph 5 of Prayer on Page 10, Plaintiff's
Complaint). To this Complaint, Zions Securities filed
a motion to dismiss and a motion to sever the causes
of action. A motion to intervene "\vas filed on behalf of
Lynn Fausett and Fiametta Fausett adopting the Cornplaint of the Plaintiff, but allegeing that these people
were currently members of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints and have made contributions in tithing
5
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and otherwise to said church. All of these motion~ \vere
heard before the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson in open
Court on the 31st day of March, 1960, and Memorandums
\vere subinitted in support of the arguments of all parties concerned. After due deliberation, Judge IIanson
then entered a Decree dismissing the la\\Tsuit insofar as
the First Cause of Action 'vas concerned against all of
the Defendants and dismissing the lawsuit insofar as
the Second Cause of Action against all Defendants except
Salt Lake City. He held that because of this determination it was unnecessary to pass upon Fauset's Inotion to
intervene. It is from this Order dismissing the causes of
action that the Appellant has appealed.
STATEMENT OF POIXTS
Zions Securities feels that the sixteen points put
forth in Plaintiff's Brief boil do\vn to two particular
issues insofar as this Defendant is concerned and will
ans\Yer the points of the Appellant by these t\\To issues.
POINT I
NEITHER PLAINTIFF NOR FAUSETT HAVE ANY
STANDING IN COURT TO SUE ZIONS SECURI'TIES.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRE·CTLY DISMISSED THE
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT AND DENIED THE INTERVENTION OF FAUSETT BECAUSE THE PLEADINGS ON
THEIR FACE SHOW THAT NEITHER THE PLAINTIFF
NOR FAUSETT STATE ANY CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST
ZIONS SECURITIES IN THE FOLLOWING P ARTI·CULARS:
!THERE IS NO ALLEGATION INVOLVING ZIONS
SECURITIES IN THE SECOND GAUSE OF ACTION.
(a)

6
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(b) IN THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION AS A MATTER
OF LAW NEITHER THE PLAINTIFF NOR FAUSETT HAS
ANY CLAIM TO ANY TRUST FUND, NOR IS THERE ANY
BREACH OF TRUST.

ARGU~IENT

POINT I
NEITHER PLAINTIFF NOR FAUSETT HAVE ANY
STANDING IN COURT TO SUE ZIO:t-~S SECURI'TIES.

Neither Plaintiff nor Fausett is a stockholder of
Defendant Zions Securities, and therefore cannot bring
an action for hin1self or other persons similarly situated
against said ·Corporation. It is admitted by Plaintiff' ..;
Complaint that Plaintiff is not a stockholder of the Defend Zions Securities, (See Paragraph 5, Page 2 of Plaintiff's Complaint); yet Plaintiff's action appears to be
in the nature of a stockholder's suit against the Corporation. That a person cannot bring a suit against a corporation of which he is not a stockholder for alleged \vrongful conduct of the corporation or its officers in the managing of corporate affairs is so basic a principle of la\v
that it needs little citation of authority. Nor is Plaintiff
or Fausett a stockholder of the Corporation of the President, which owns all of the stock of Zions Securities, except for qualifying shares of directors. In discussing '"·ho
has the right to sue in a "Stockholder's Suit,'' Fletcher
Cyclopedia Corporations, Vol. 13, Sec. 5972 states:
''Relief may be obtained, in a proper case, at
the suit of a single stockholder, but the fact that
no other minority stockholders come in as plaintiffs may properly be considered.
7
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".A stockholder cannot :ille unless he is a stockholder in fact at the ti1ne the suit is brought. If
he has not yet become a stockholder by reason of
nonperformance of his contract of subscription
or contract for the purchase of shares, or by reason of the fact that his subscription is upon a condition precedent which has not yet been performed
by the corporation, or if he has ceased to be a
stockholder by reason of a transfer or forfeiture
of his shares, he has no standing to complain. A
citizen is not a stockholder "Tho may join as plaintiff in a suit affecting a corporation in which the
public owns stock. Necessarily there must have
been an issue of stock and the acquisition of a
right thereto. A 'contract holder' in a tontine
diamond selling corporation cannot be regarded
as a stockholder by reason of the fact that no
certificates of stock other than such contracts
have been issued." (Emphasis added.)
It now appears from the Appellant's Brief that he
concedes that the Plaintiff has no standing to complain
about the use of the funds by Zions Securities or the
Corporation of the President.
"It will be observed that in the Con1plaint
plaintiff does not claim that he is presently a
member of the L.D.S. Church. That being so it
1nay be doubted if he 1nay be heard to conzplain of
the 1nanner in u·hich the trust fund held b,ll defen.da.nts corporation of the President and Zions
Sec11rit·ies are being expended notwithstanding
plaintiff 1chile a nze1nber of such Church paid his
tithing and n1ade other contr£lnd£ons to the L.D.S.
Church." (Emphasis added) (Pag-e -!5 of ~\ppel
lant's Brief)
If there is any doubt in the Court's n1ind about the
fact thnt a person "Tho has been a n1ember of a religious
8
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organization and "·ithdra\Y~l therefro1n or has been <~x
pelled or exconnnunicated therefrom ha~ no interest in
the ehurch propert~T and cannot represent 1ne1nbers of
the rhurch in an action to prevent an alleged diversion
of church property fro1n its lawful uses. The follo\\Ting
are cited in support of this doctrine:
45 -l1nz. Jur., p. 743, "Religious Societies," Par. 18
reads:
'~It

has been held that an expelled Inenlh~·r hn~
no interest in the church propPrty and that excommunicated members whose names have by the
valid action of the church been expunged fro1n
its membership roll cannot stand for and represent members of the church in an action to prevent the diversion of church property from its
lawful uses ... "
See also Nance v. Busby, 91 Tenn. 303, 18 S.W.
87-!, 15 L.R.A. 801. The above was quoted with approval
in Stewart v. Jarriel, 206 Ga. 855, 59 S.E. (2d) 368, and
the court continued:
"Where, as in this case, the validity of the
expulsion of the plaintiffs as members of the
church - grow out of a controversy relating to
the faith, teaching, doctrine, and discipline of the
church, and judgment of the church with a congregational form of government with respect thereto
is conclusive upon the civil courts, whether, in the
opinion of the judges of such courts the decision
appears to be right or wrong, for courts of equity
"'"ill not interfere with the internal affairs of
a religious organization involving questions of
faith, practice, doctrine, discipline, ecclesiastical
law, rule, custom, or church government."
9
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In Canovaro v. Brothers of Order of Her;nits, etc.
( Pa.) 191 A. 140, the court said:
"If persons who claim to exercise the right of
control and disposition are not members, either
because of excomrnunication or otherwise (Merman v. St. 1fary's G. C. Church, 317 Pa. 33, 176
A. 450) or have changed their n1embership to a
church in another parish, or a change or parish
lines has caused them to beco1ne members of another church (St. Casemir's Polish R. ·C. Church's
case, supra), they do not retain any right, nor
do they have any voice, in the control or disposition of the property of the church of which they
were once members. Dismemberment of the parish
of our Lady of Good Counsel \Yorked this result
. . . their right and obligations as members are
governed by the la\\Ts of that denomination. Since
the voluntary act of joining the church subjects
them to its rules and regulations. The Roman
Catholic canons and the decisions of the appropriate tribunals and officials of the church are decisive of the issues here raised, unless in contravention of the la\v of the land. The order of dismemberment \\~as binding on the parish n1en1ber~.
Division, disn1ember1nent, or suppres~ion or parishes, and the effect thereof on Inembership are
purely ecclesiastical 1natters, dependent upon the
church la\\T as adn1inistered by the appropriate
authorities and tribunals. See St. Case1ner's
Polish R. C. Church's Case, supra. 273 Pa. 494 at
Page 501, 117 A. 219. The effect of the disinemberment of the parish and the transfer of appellant's membership therefron1 to other parishes
was to deprive them of all rights as members in
the church property· of the parish from which they
were transferred. ·Church men1ber8hip is an ecclesiastical matter, not temporal. There ts no property right in 1ncmbership, and there co·uld be no

10
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]Jroperty right i,n ;nc})tbership, and there could be
Ho ]Jroperty ri.r;hts 'in lay Htembers except through
their JHenlucrship in tlze con[Jregation.·· (Emphasis added)
Sec~

also, lV c!son v. JI onitor Congregational Clrurch,
et al., 7-I~ Or. 1G2, 1-1:5 P. 3~i, 'vhere the court said:
'"The plaintiff is not sho,,·n to be a member of
either of the church organizations mentioned and
hence not in a p·osition to question the act of any
of these societies in the matter of conveying its
property. We find in 34 Cyc. 1172, note 88, the
following:

'A nonmember of the church or society cannot
;naintain an act~on to regulate the ttlse of the
ch1trch property, even though he was one of the
orig~nal grantors or was formerly a member of
the society.' " (Emphasis added)
The san1e principle of la\v "\Vould apply if a group
or the entire congregation "\vithdra\YS.
In Iiolt v. Trone, 341 Mich. 169, 67 N.vV. (2d) 125
where Plaintiffs \vere removed as elders of the church,
the court said :
"In the case at bar plaintiffs were removed
as elders of the church by vote of the membership
of the church.
'"The court finds that the plaintiffs \Vere not
elders of the Joseph Campau Church of Christ at
the time of filing this bill of complaint and had
no rights in or to the church propert~~, either as
officers of said church or in their individual capacity; that the right to th~~ use and control of the
church propert:~ is vested in the church body oT
congregation acting through its trustees."
11
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In Presbytery of Bismarck v. Allen, 74 ~.D. -100, 2:~
N.W. ( :2d) 625 the court quotes from the leading ease of
Watsnn v. Jones, 13 Wall (1TS) 679, 20 L. Ed. 666:
"It is obvious that the case at bar falls in
the third class. The First Pre:-; byterian Church
of Leith organized as a Presbyterian church. For
more than twenty-five years it continued as an integral part of a larger church body; it recognized
the authority and control of the so-called higher
judicatory; it incorporated to promote religious
worship according to the usages of the Presbyterian Church, which at the tin1e "\Yas called the
Presbyterian Church in the lTnited State:-; of
America; its trustees were bound by the general
laws, rules, and customs of said Presbyterian
Church.
"'In Watson v. Jones, supra, the court concludes its opinion in the following words: 'But we
need pursue this subject no further. \Vhatever
1nay have been the case before the Kentucky court,
the appellants in the case presented to us have
separated themselves wholly fro1n the church
organization to 'vhich they belonged "\Yhen this
controversy commenced. r~[ hey no"T deny its authority, denounce its action, and refuse to abide
by its judgments. They have fir~t erected theinselves into a new organization, and have since
joined themselves to another totally different, if
not hostile, to the one which they belonged "Then
the difficulty first began. [] nder any of the decisions which we have exarnined_, the appellants,
in their present position, have no right to the
property, or to the use of its u~hich is the subject
of this suit.'" (Emphasis added)
1

12
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1

1 rustees of J>ellcador J>resbyteriun Church c.
Gibsoll, ~() DPL Ch. :~7;), ~:2 A (~d) 782 'vherein the court
said:
SPP

"The congregation Inay secede, but they cannot take 'vith them the church property even if
their action is unanimous. Trustees of Presbytery
v. Trustees of Presbyterian Church of Weeha""kin,
8 N.J.L. 57:2, 78 A. 207. And this is for the reason,
as 'vill hereafter be shown, that the church property does not belong to the congregation."
Even if the assun1ption is Inade for the purpose of
argument only that there is a fund held by Zions Securities ":hich is a trust fund of the Church bf Jesus Christ
of Latter-day Saints no relief should be granted the
Plaintiff or Fausett because neither has any standing
to sue.
If the alleged trust were a private trust ('vhich it is
not) there would be no doubt that the Plaintiff or Fausett, if a beneficiar~,. could maintain a suit in his behalf to
enforce the trust. In the present case, however, it is alleged by the Plaintiff and Fausett that it is a charitable
trust, (Paragraph 7, Page 2 of Complaint), and in a charitable trust the beneficiary is the community itself. Scott
on Trusts, Second Edition, 1956, p. 2614. A private individual cannot maintain a suit to enforce the charitable
trust. Dickey v. W olker, 321 ~{o. 2335, 11 S.W. 2d ~78,
62 A.L.R. 858, 1928, cert. denied ~79 U.S. 839, 49 S. Ct.
252, 73 L. Ed. 986, 1929.

Scott on Trusts, Section 391, pages 2056-2058, hns
the following to say about the enforcement of charitable
trusts, to wit:

13
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"On the other hand, a person who has no
interest in the performance of the trust, no interest other than as a member of the community,
cannot maintain a suit for the enforcement of the
trust. He may, if he can, induce the Attorney General to bring a suit, and the Attorney General
may, if he chooses, bring the suit, only if the complaining person is willing to act as relator and
assume responsibility for the payment of costs.
But a third person who has no special interest
cannot himself maintain the suit. If a third person were permitted to sue as a matter of right
it "\vould be possible to subject the charity to harassing litigation. Thus where a testator left his
estate in trust to establish and maintain an art
1nuseum in a city, a resident and taxpayer of the
city cannot maintain a suit to enforce the trust.
The mere fact that a person 1nay in the discretion
of the trustee become a recipient of a benefit
under the trust does not entitle him to maintain
a suit for the enforcement of the trust. Thus in a
case in Connecticut "\Vhere an estate was left in
trust to 1naintain a home for needy female teachers in a certain country, it ''Tas held that a suit
to enforce the trust could not be maintained by a
group of needy teachers. Chief Justice 'Vheeler
however, dissented on the ground that the class
of beneficiaries was small enough so that its members had a sufficient interest to permit them to
ntaintain a suit for the enforcement of the trust.
\Vhere a trust is created to 1naintain a charitable
institution, the managers and other agents or employees engaged in the conducting of the institution have not such an interest in the performance
of the trust as to permit them to maintain a suit
for its enforcement.
"The question remains 'vhether the settlor or
his heirs or personal representatives can maintain a suit for the enforce1nent of a charitable

14
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

trust. As we hare seen, the settlor cannot revoke
u r modify a charitable trttst created by him unless
he has reserved a power to do so. After the tr-nst
is once created, he has no beneficial interest in the
tru,st property. ..A.ccordingly, it has been held in
a n1tmber of cases that the settlor has no standing to maintain a suit for the enforcement of a
cha·ritable trust. There are, however, cases in
which the opposite result has been reached. But
where the settlor has a special interest in the performance of the trust he can maintain a suit to
enforce it. Thus in a case in New York it was held
that where an association of the alumni of an educational institution gave a fund to the institution
for the establishment of a professorship, reserving power to nominate the professor, the association could maintain a suit to enforce the trust.''
(Emphasis added)
The Restaternent of Trusts, Section 391 (d) states:
"d. Person having no special interest. A
suit for the enforcement of a charitable trust cannot be maintained by persons who have no special
interest in the enforcement of the trust. The mere
fact that as members of the public they benefit
from the enforcement of the trust is not a sufficient ground to entitle them to sue, since a suit
on their behalf can be maintained by the Attorney
General."
To the same effect see 10 Am. Jur., ucharities," Sec.
116, 8670.
In the present case, neither the Plaintiff nor Fausett
the attorney general, nor is either a trustee of the
trust, so neither has any standing to sue on either basis.

IS

The remaining question is whether or not the Plaintiff

15
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or Fausett has any special interest in the trust to entitle
either to sue. It has been held that a special interest is
something identifiable that separates the individual from
the community - something that gives the individual
rights outside his rights as a community member. For
example it has been held that a trust for the salary of a
minister of the church can be enforced by the minister
(First Congregational Society in Raynham v. Trustees,
23 Pick, 1±8, (~lass.) 1839) ; that a trust set up to endo\v
a professional chair may be enforced by the professor
occupying the chair (Scott on Trusts, Second Edition,
1956, p. 2758.) ; that property given in trust to a charitable corporation may be enforced by the corporation
(Iiarvard College v. Armory, 9 Pick 446. (:Jiass.) 1830);
or where it is provided that preference shall be given to
certain persons in the performance of a trust these persons can maintain a suit to enforce the trust. (Darcy r.
Kelley, 153 Mass. 433, 26 N .E. 1110, 1891). In the present
case neither the Plaintiff nor Fausett possesses any
quality to differentiate him from any other member of
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints or of
the com1nunity itself. He is literally one of a million, and
to allo"'" him standing would be to strain the idea of special interest to the point of ridirulousness. The Plaintiff's remedy lies in asking the Attorney General or the
Corporation of the President or Zions Securities to bring
suit. Any other re1nedy \Yould open up all charitable institutions to a multitude of ~uits by malcontents, and
\Vould dissipate the funds of the eharity in legal proceed1ngs.

16
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POINT II.
THE ·TRIAL COURT CORRE·CTLY DISMISSED THE
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT AND DENIED THE INTERVENTION OF FAUSETT BECAUSE THE PLEADINGS ON
THEIR FACE SHOW THAT NEITHER THE PLAINTIFF
NOR FAUSETT STATE ANY CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST
ZIONS SECURITIES IN THE FOLLOWING PARTI·CULARS:
'THERE IS NO ALLEGATION INVOLVING ZION"S
SECURITIES IN THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION.
(a)

In Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action they allege
that on January 1-!, 1959, Salt Lake City entered into a
contract 'vith the Uorporation of the President whereby
the city agreed to sell to the Corporation of the President the property known as Forest Dale. (Paragraph
3, Page 10-11 of Plaintiff's Complaint.) The prayer for
relief in the Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action sin1ply
asks, ''That the contract above mentioned be declared
null and void." (Paragraph 1 of Prayer, Page 11 of
Plaintiff's Complaint.)
In Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action, he does not
claim that Zions Securities was in any way tied into or
affected by the contract with Salt Lake City.
Rule 12 (b) (6) U.R.C.P. was designed particularly
to cover matters of this kind. The motion of Zions Securities to dismiss upon the grounds that no claim is
stated against this Defendant is well taken. This motion
to dismiss performs substantially the same function as
the old common law rule on demurrer. (See Moore's Fed.
Prac., \ 7 ol. 2, p. 2244). See also ~11 Anz. J1tr .., ··PLEAIJ.ING," Sec. 212, p. 442, ";herein it states:
17
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"A pleading may be subject to a general demurrer either because its allegations disclose no
cause of action or defense, or because of the want
of definite allegations essential to a cause of
action or defense. Thus, a pleading which states
only legal conclusions instead of facts is demurrerable.''
The Utah case of Hunt v. llfonroe, 32 l . . tah 428, 435,
91 Pac. 269 stated :
"It is elementary that a complaint good in
law must not only state a complete cause of action
against the Defendant but it must also show a
right of action in the plaintiff.''
The only issue raised by the Appellant in connection
with this particular point is found in Point XI and
Point XIV of Appellant's Brief, and the argument is
identical on the two points, since Point XI"\T simply says
that they adopt what is said under Point XI. In this
particular instance, they argue that to allow the Defendant, ·Corporation of the President or Zions Securities to buy any property is to violate the Constitution
of the state of Utah and in particular Section

4~

Article

I of said Constitution which reads as follo,vs:
". . . There shall be no union of church and
state, nor shall any church don1inate the state or
interfere with its functions." ...
First, tl1ere has been no dealing 'vith the state of

lJtah in the case before the Court. Second, even if it
"'"ere asstuned that the contract "~as bet\Yeen the church
and the state there has been no union of church and state.
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In the present case there is a contract for sale of
land to the Corporation of the President and not Zions
~PeLLrities. The purchase price or terms of the contract
have not been attacked as being unconsionable or unfair
to either party, nor do the actions of either party point
to overreaching. In fact, both parties seem \vell aware
of "·hat is happening, and appear to agree that the sale
of land will be beneficial to the community.
Any interpretation of this section of the Utah Constitution to prevent the sale of public land to religious
institutions would be beyond the 1neaning of the clause,
and it would hinder the activity of both the state and
religious groups in their dealing one with the other. The
reason for the provision in the Constitution is to prevent
religions from applyng pressure because of their size
and influence on the state government. In the present
case \\'"here the Church is acting in the same capacity
as a private person there is no reason to invoke this
provision. In the beginning of our country and our state
'vhen all land was the property of the state the interpretation urged by the Plaintiff would mean that the
govern1nent and church could not contract for the sale
of the land, and that all religious groups would have to
\\·ait to purchase land from private individuals -

such

interpretation was never intended nor such action contemplated.
It is to shape the word "union'' beyond reason to
say it means "there shall be no vendor-vendee relation
het,veen church and state.''
19
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(b) IN THE FIRST CAUSE OF A·CTION AS A MATTER
OF LAW NEITHER 'THE PLAINTIFF NOR FAUSETT HAS
ANY CLAIM TO ANY TRUST FUND, NOR IS THERE ANY
BREA·CH OF TRUST.

Substantially the only difference betw. een the Complaint of the Plaintiff and the Complaint in Intervention
of the Fausetts is that it is alleged that the Fausetts
are no\v, and at all times herein alleged, have been members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints,
and that they have made contributions in tithing and
otherwise to said chureh; that by reason of said contribution being so made and being n1embers of the Church,
they have a vested interest in the trust fund 1nentioned
in the co1nplaint filed. It is admitted that the Plaintiff
Stone is not a member of the church.
Since Zions Securities is a corporation organized
for pecuniary profit it can do nearly anything a natural
person can do. Only a stockholder could complain. X ot\vithstanding, we present the follo\Ying cases "'"hich discuss the matter of the trustee's relationship occupied by
a religious organization in respect to its 1nembers.
In ltf c~T rilly v. First Presbyterian Ch urrlz. ~-l-3 :Jiass.
331, 137 N.E. 691 the court held:
'~It

follo,vs that the gifts to the corporation
1n the case at bar " . .herehy its \Yas enabled to
arquire land, a 1neeting house and n1anse, \Yere
gifts to a valid public charity. l\ one of these gifts
\vere 1nade upon an~. . express trust. They simply
\vere handed over to the corporation "'"ith only
the implication "'"hich arise by la\Y fro1n such
donations.
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'"The faets as to the collection of 1noney, the
of the church and the organization
of the corporation are indistinguishable in their
legal aspeet~ from those appearing in litigation
concerning the religious society before this court
in
arner v. Bowdoin Square Baptist Society,
1-!S ~lass. 400, 19 N.E. 403. It there was said by
~lr. Justice Holmes at page 404 of 148 Mass. at
page 403 of 19 K.E.:
establi~lnnent

''r
~~

'It is too well settled to admit of argument
that the foregoing facts do not make the legal
corporation a trustee for the church.'
"1\1o such trust is shown in the case at bar
because the gifts were all to the corporation without e~rpress trust or condition of any kind. These
gifts being thus free from express trust or limitation, must be held to have been intended for
the lp,romotion,!,. of the purposes for ~hich the
corporation was instituted and subject to all the
conditions thereby imported by the nature of the
donee. The corporation is a creature of the la'\v.
It possesses those powers, is subject to the obligations and enjoys the immunities and privileges
conferred upon it by the law of the land. A religious society, when it becomes a corporation,
rests tttpon the foundation established for it by
the law. The corporation defendant in the case at
bar was organized as a religious society under
the general laws of this commonwealth.
"'The sirnple declaration implied from the
name and from the adoption of the hy-la\vs by
the corporation that the policy of a particular
denomination as to the selection of ministers
would be followed, cannot be regarded as an
abandonment of its constitutional powers. It does
not convert free gifts into gifts upon an implied
trust that such policy shall be observed. These
gifts were to the corporation upon the charity
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that they should be employed in general for the
worship of God. There is no contention that the
general charity for which the corporation was
organized has been perverted in any other particular than in the selection of the minister.
"The present majority of the corporation
constitute its dominating power by regular succession and in due order. There is no such trust
imposed on the property as requ~res inquiYry into
the conform·ity of present members, or the regularity of the corporate action brought about by
them, to the views of r~tinisterial call entertained
by the great body of Presbyter~ans or established
by the ecclesiastical policy of that denomination.
See Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall." (Emphasis added)
Although there is no trust relationship bet\veen
Zions Securities and Plaintiff or Fausett, it may be
helpful to the Court to review the following authorities
as to the standing of a donor to a fund devoted to charity
in a court of equity as to its disposition and control:
See 14 C.J.S. ''Charities," p. 526 "'"herein it states:

'· . A. s a general rule, the contributors to a fund
creating a trust for mere charitable purposes cannot call the trustee of that fund to an account
for a misapplication of the fund or any other
breach of the trust. There 1nust be something
peculiar in the transaction, beyond the mere fact
of contribution, to give a contributor to a charitable fund a foothold in court to enable him to
question the disposition of the fund." (See also
10 Am. Jur., "Charities,'' Sec. 116, page 670 to
the sa1ne effect.)
The ease of . ·l n1undson v. /(let.zing - J/ cLanghlin
Men1. Found. College. 2--+7 lo\YU 91, 73 N.\,T. 2d~ 11-±,
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'vas a ease \\'here the heirs sought to rornpell an accounting of a fund and clairned it was being 1nisapplied. The
trial court dismissed their complaint and the state Supreme Court affirmed. lieadnote K o. 7 clearly states

the holding as follows:
HWhere the donor has effectually passed out
of himself all interest in the fund devoted to a
charity, neither he nor those claiming under him
have any standing in a court of equity as to its
disposition and control."
In the Amundson Case, supra, the court further
stated at Page 117:
Plaintiffs' only interest in the college is a
sentimental one which was not sufficient basis
for enlisting aid of the court, however laudable
their purpose may be in seeking such aid. No
financial or other advantage which the law recognizes will accrue to plaintiffs from execution
of the trust. Nor have they suffered any financial
loss from the matters of which they complaim.
The mere fact that as members of the public they
1nay benefit from the enforcement of the trust
does not ent~tle them to sue." (Emphasis added)
H

In Society of California Pioneers, et al, v. Ill cElroy,
et al, 63 C.A. 2d 332, 1±6 P. ( 2d) 962, 967, the court states

as follows:
"The law is well settled that when property
has become fully vested in trustees for a valid
charitable purpose, neither the creater of the
trust nor his heirs or assigns have any standing
in court in a proceeding to compel the proper
execution of the trust, except as relators."
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Where the testor donated to a home for wayward
girls in the City of Portland, an attempt was made thereafter by his heirs to control disposition of the fund, the
court held:
"Plaintiffs (the heirs) have no more interest
in the property involved in the litigation than if
they "\Yere absolute strangers to the blood of the
benevolent testator. The generous fund provided
for said home belongs to public charity and one
not interested directly in the adn1inistration of
that fund or the dul~T appointed officer of the
state cannot maintain a legal proceeding for an
accounting or the control of the administration
of said fund.'' (Citing numerous cases) lV em me
et al v. Naves et al, 134 Or. 590, 294 P. 602, 603
(1930).
Therefore, Plaintiff has no standing to interfere in
any way "\vith the conduct and 1nanagement of said fund.
See, also, Fa1:rbanks v. City of Appleton, 249 \Y.isc. 476,
24 N. W. (2d) 893.
The Restatement of Trusts, Section 391 (d) states:
"d. Person having no special interest. .A._ suit
for the enforce1nent of a charitable trust cannot
be 1naintained by per~ons "\Yho haYe no special
interest in the enforce1nent of the tru~t. The
1nere fact that as n1e1nbers of the public they
benefit from the enforce1nent of the trust is not
a sufficient ground to entitle then1 to sue~ since
a suit on their behalf can be 1naintained by the
Attorney General."
Even if \\Te assu1ne for the purpose of this argu1nent
that there is a trust fund in "\vhich Plaintiff and Fausett
have an interest and if \\T0 furthPr a~sun1e that they can
24
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bring an aetion in connection \vith the adn1inistration
of such trust fund, the court still properly disn1issed thu
complaint because there has been no breach of the trust.
Plaintiff's only allegation is that the ·'trust fund" is
being u~ed for the purchase of a site for the proposed
FPderal Building. Insofar as Zions Securities is coneerned, the corporate laws of the State of Utah (U.C.A.
1953, 16-2-14:) give it the power to contract and the power
to buy and sell real estate or even the power to make
donations for the public welfare or for charitable, scientific, religious or educational purposes. (See particularly the 1955 amendment to 16-2-14.)
The complaint of the Plaintiff and Fausett alleges:

u7. That the purpose or object of defendant,
Corporation of The President of the ·Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, as stated in
its Articles of Incorporation is to acquire, hold,
dispose of such real and personal property as
may be conveyed to or acquired by said ·Corporation for the benefit of the members of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, a religious
society for the benefit of religion, for works of
charity, and for public worship." (Emphasis
added) (Pargraph 7, page 2, Plaintiff's Complaint.)
In the Articles of Incorporation of the Corporation
of the President it states:
HSecond: The object of this corporation shall
be to acquire, hold and dispose of such real and
personal property as many be conveyed to or
acquired by said corporation for the benefit of
the members of the Church of Jesus ·Christ of
Latter-day Saints, a religious society, for the
benefit of religion, for works of charity and for
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public worship. Such real and personal property
may be situated, wither 'vithin the State of Utah,
or elsewhere, and this corporation shall have
power, without any authority or authorization
from the members of such Church or religious
society, to grant, sell, convey, rent, mortgage, exchange, or otherwise dispose of any part or all
of such property." (Emphasis added)
Thus it is abundantly clear that both by the allegations and by the laws of this state Zions Securities and
the Corporation of the President can use their funds
for "works of charity." The use of funds for gifts for
governmental or municipal purposes is a use for "~rorks
of charity.'' This is clearly stated in 10 An~. Jur., ~"Chari
ties," Section 79, p. 641 as follows:
"A Gift in trust for a legal purpose that will
tend to reduce taxation and lessen the burdens
of government is a charitable gift. Gifts to the
government for its general benefit or for the reduction of the state or national debt are valid.
In this connection, gifts for varied municipal
purposes, whether general or specific in terms,
are usually sustained as valid charitable gifts.
The American Law Institute Restatement is in
accord with these principles, as it states that a
trust for government or municipal purposes is
charitable, although the purpose is not to supply
the community with any specified facilities.
Therefore, a gift of land in trust for the use of
the inhabitants of a to,,:n is a gift for a valid
charitable purpose.
"Likewise, it is .a ralid and enforceable charity to give funds for the erection of a public
building to be used for governn1ental purposes,
for general municipal improvements, for the improvement of the municipal streets, including
26
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

..

..

paving, cleaning, and lighting them, for the provision of a good and \vholesome water supply for
the city or community, for municipal fire equipment, or for the improvement of the municipal
police force. For the same reasons, a gift of a
fund to be applied in constructing a pesthouse
constitutes a public charity, as do gifts for the
laying out, improvement and repair of highways
and bridges, or for the purchase of life boats.
A gift for the establishment or support of a public park also is a charitable gift. Similarly, a gift
to preserve or develop the beauties of nature is
a valid charity for the purpose which might have
been undertaken by a governmental agency at the
public expense." (Emphasis added)
See also Restatement of Trusts (Second) Section
373 ~hich states:

"A trust for the erection or maintenance of
public buildings, bridges, streets, highways, parks
or other public works or for other governmental
or municipal purposes is charitable."
The mere fact that the gift or bequest may also work
a benefit to the federal taxpayers does not change the
charitable nature of the gift. (See Re Tarrant, 38 Cal.
2d 42, 237 P. 2d 505, 28 A.L.R. 2d 419.)
See also Scott on Trusts, Vol. 3, wherein he discusses charitable trusts and states the following on pages
1998 and 1999 :
"373. Governmental or municipal purposes.
A trust for the erection or construction or maintenance of public works is charitable. In the Statute of Charitable Uses are included trusts 'for
repair of bridges, ports, havens, cause\vayR,
27
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churches, sea-banks and high\vays.' It has been
held that a trust for the purpose of supplying
the community with these or other facilities, \Yhich
are usually supplied at the expense of taxpayers,
is charitable. 1 hus the co?Jrts lurue upheld trust.s
for the erection of a town hall or sinlilar public
building; for the construction or repair of highways; for the erection or maintenance of bridges;
for the establishment or maintenance of public
parks; for the construction of water works; for
protection against fire; and the like. A trust may
be charitable, not only because it is for a governmental or municipal purpose, but because it is
also for the relief of poverty, or for the advancement of education, or for the pro1notion of health.
Thus a trust to maintain a public almshouse, or
a public school, or a municipal hospital, is clearly
charitable.
1

"373.1. General Trusts for public purposes.
A trust for the benefit of the nation, or a state
of municipality is charitable, although the particular method of applying the property i.s not
provided for. Thus trusts for the following purposes have been upheld; for the benefit of a
town; for purposes conducing to the good of a
certain county and parish; for public \vorks of
a city; for the benefit of the nation; for general
town expenses: for the benefit and orna1nent of
a to\vn; for the improvement of a city.'' (Emphasis added)
It is iu1possible to see ho\\T the action of the Defendant Zions Securitie~ or the Corporation of the Pre~ident
could be dPPined anything but charitable in light of the
prevailing A1nerican authority on the subject. X or is
there any validity in the arglunent that the h\Yorks of
charity'' be ~on fined to the 1nembers of the Church. The
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cia uses contained in the second article of the .1\.rticles of

ln<'orporation l)ach stand alone as purposes of the Corporation of the President. It is only a stilted interpretation that would make ''works of charity" apply only
to the Mormon Church. That the interpretation of "works
of eharity'' must apply to all people is borne out by the
hi~tory of the Mormon Church since the Church from its
beginning as given to such charities as the Boy Scouts
of America and the lJnited Fund. But even if the court
should adopt the interpretation that .. ,,~orks of charity~'
must apply to the benefit of the Inembers of the Thiormon
Church, it would not make the act done by the Corporation of the President a breach of trust since this court
held in Staines v. Burton, 17 lTtah 331, 53 Pac. 1015,
that a trust for ""schools, parks, water works, planting
forests, accli1natizing plants" \vas a charitable trust and
that it was for the benefit of the members of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.
Therefore, taking the interpretation most favorable
to the Plaintiff or Fausett there has been no breach of
trust, since the act was a ''charitable work" and it benefited the members of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints.
CONCLUSION
This Defendant Zions Securities, respectfully submits that:
(1)

Neither Plaintiff nor Fausett have any stand-

ing in court to sue this Defendant;
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(2) The Second ·Cause of Action fails to state any
claim against this Defendant;
(3) There is no trust fund that either Plaintiff nor
Fausett can have any legal interest in; and
( 4) There has been no breach of any "trust'' because lawfully this Defendant and the Corporation of
the President can lawfully use their funds for "'vorks
of charity" and the use of funds for a site for a Federal
Building is a "work of charity" within the law.
Respectfully submitted,
Arthur H. Nielsen
Dean E. Conder
Attorneys for Defendant and
Respondent Zions Securities
Corporation
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